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Abstract—Covert communication can prevent an adversary
from knowing that a wireless transmission has occurred. In
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, a square root
law is found that Alice can reliably and covertly transmit O(√n)
bits to Bob in n channel uses. In this paper, we consider covert
communications in noisy wireless networks, where the receivers
not only experience the background noise, but also the aggregate
interference from other transmitters. Our results show that
uncertainty in interference experienced by the adversary Willie
is beneficial to Alice. In AWGN channels, when the distance
between Alice and Willie da,w = ω(n
1/(2α)) (α is the path loss
exponent), Alice can reliably and covertly transmit O(log2
√
n)
bits to Bob in n channel uses. Although the covert throughput is
lower than the square root law, the spatial throughput is higher.
In THz (Terahertz) Band networks, covert communication is
more difficult because Willie can simply place a receiver in the
narrow beam between Alice and Bob to detect or block their
LOS (Line-of-Sight) communications. We then present a covert
communication scheme that utilizes the reflection or diffuse
scattering from a rough surface to prevent being detected by
Willie. From the network perspective, the communications are
hidden in the interference of noisy wireless networks, and what
Willie sees is merely a “shadow” wireless network.
Index Terms—Physical-layer Security; Covert Communica-
tions; AWGN Channel; THz Band.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional cryptography methods for network security can
not solve all security problems. In wireless networks, if a user
wishes to communicate covertly (without being detected by
other detectors), encryption to preventing eavesdropping is not
enough [1]. Even if a message is encrypted, the metadata,
such as network traffic pattern, can reveal some sensitive in-
formation [2]. Furthermore, if the adversary cannot detect the
transmissions, he has no chance to launch the “eavesdropping
and decoding” attack even if he has boundless computing
and storage capabilities. In a battlefield, soldiers hope to hide
their tracks so they need to communicate covertly. Another
occasion, such as defeating “Panda-Hunter” attack [3], also
needs to prevent the adversary from detecting transmission
behavior to protect user’s location privacy.
Consider a scenario that a transmitter Alice would like to
send a message to a receiver Bob covertly over a wireless
channel in order to not being detected by a warden Willie.
In [4], Bash et al. found a square root law in additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, that is, Alice can transmit
O(√n) bits reliably and covertly to Bob over n uses of
wireless channels. The square root law implies pessimistically
that the asymptotic privacy rate approaches zero. If Willie
does not know the time of the transmission attempts of Alice,
Alice can reliably transmitO(min{(n logT (n))1/2, n}) bits to
Bob while keeping Willie’s detector ineffective with a slotted
AWGN channel containing T (n) slots [5]. To improve the
performance of covert communication, Lee et al. [6] found
that, Willie has measurement uncertainty about its noise level
due to the existence of SNR wall [7], then they obtained an
asymptotic privacy rate which approaches a non-zero constant.
Following Lee’s work, He et al. [8] defined new metrics
to gauge covertness of communication, and Liu et al. [9]
took the interference measurement uncertainty into consid-
erations. Wang et al. [10] considered covert communication
over discrete memoryless channels (DMC), and found that
privacy rate scales like the square root of blocklength. Bloch
et al. [11] discussed the covert communication problem from a
resolvability perspective. He developed an alternative coding
scheme such that, if warden’s channel statistics are known,
on the order of
√
n reliable covert bits may be transmitted to
Bob over n channel uses with only on the order of
√
n bits
of secret key.
In general, the covertness of communication is due to
the existence of noise that the adversary cannot accurately
distinguish between signal and noise. If we can increase the
measurement uncertainty of adversary, the performance of
covert communication can be improved.
Interference or jamming is usually considered harmful to
wireless communications, but it is also a useful security tool.
Cooperative jamming is regarded as a prevalent physical-layer
security approach [12] [13] [14]. Sobers et al. [15] [16] utilized
cooperative jamming to carry out covert communications. To
achieve the transmission of O(n) bits covertly to Bob over n
uses of channel, they added a “jammer” to the environment
to help Alice for security objectives. Liu et al. [17] exploited
the interference from other transmitters in the network to hide
the transmission of sensitive information in IoT. Soltani et
al. [18] [19] considered a network scenario where multiple
“friendly” nodes generate interference to hide the transmission
from multiple adversaries.
In this work, we consider covert communication in a wire-
less network, where Bob and Willie not only experience the
background noise, but also interference from other transmitters
(Fig.1). Since the measure uncertainty of aggregate interfer-
ence is greater than the background noise, the uncertainty of
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Fig. 1. System configuration of covert communication in a wireless network.
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Fig. 2. Schematic of covert communication between Alice and Bob with a
warden Willie in a THz Band network. The red lines AO1 and O1B denote
the specular reflection path, the blue lines AO2 and O2B represent the diffuse
scattering path. The black circles Tx are transmitters, and the white circles
Rx are receivers.
Willie will increase along with the increase of interference.
We consider two kind of communication channels: AWGN
channels and THz (Terahertz) Band channels. THz Band
signals are often assumed to be more secure than lower
frequency signals due to the more directional transmission
and the more narrow beams. However this also makes covert
communication difficult. Willie can simply place a receiver in
the LOS (Line-of-Sight) path between Tx and Rx to find and
block their communications. Alice and Bob may need resorting
to the aggregate interference and NLOS (Non-Line-of-Sight)
communications to improve the security and hiding.
In a dense wireless network with AWGN channels, we
found that covert communication between Alice and Bob
is still possible. Alice can reliably and covertly transmit
O(log2
√
n) bits in n channel uses when the distance between
Alice and Willie da,w = ω(n
1/(2α)) (α is path loss exponent).
Although the covert throughput is lower than the square root
law, the spatial throughput is higher, and Alice does not
presuppose the location knowledge of Willie. In THz Band
communication networks, although the LOS communications
can be detected easily by Willie, we found that communi-
cation based on reflection or diffuse scattering may be a
possible information hiding method. As depicted in Fig. 2, the
communication via specular reflection path
−−−−→
AO1B or diffuse
scattering path
−−−−→
AO2B can evade detection by Willie. In a
dense network, the scattering signals Willie eavesdropping are
masked by the ambient noise and the aggregate interference.
From the perspective of network, the noisy wireless channels
make the network “shadow” to Willie.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, prior to presenting the system model, we give
a running example to illustrate the problem of covert wireless
communications discussed in this paper.
A. Motivating Scenario
Covert communication has a very long history. It is always
related with steganography [20] which conceals messages in
audio, visual or textual content. However, steganography is an
application layer technique and is not suitable in physical-layer
covert communication. The well-known physical-layer covert
communication is spread spectrum which is using to protect
wireless communication from jamming and eavesdropping
[21]. Another kind of covert communications is network covert
channels [22] [23] in computer networks. While steganography
requires some contents as covers, a network covert channel
requires network protocols as carrier. In this paper, we con-
sider physical-layer covert communication that employs the
background noise and the aggregate interference in wireless
channels to hide user’s transmission attempts.
Let us take a source-location privacy problem as an ex-
ample. In Panda-Hunter Game [3], a sensor network with a
large number of sensors is deployed to monitor the habitat of
pandas. As soon as a panda is observed by a sensor, this sensor
reports the readings to a sink via a multi-hop wireless channel.
However, a hunter (Willie) is wandering around in the habitat
in order to capture pandas. The hunter does not care about the
readings of sensors, what he really cares about is the location
of the message originator, the first sensor who discovers the
panda. To find the location of pandas, he listens to a sensor in
his vicinity to determine whether this sensor is transmitting
or not. If he finds a transmitter, he then searches for the
next sensor who is communicating with this transmitter. Via
this method, he can trace back to the message originator and
catch the panda. As a result, the source-location information
becomes critical and must be protected in this occasion.
To tackle this problem, Kamat et al. proposed phantom
routing techniques to provide source-location privacy from
the perspective of network routing [3]. From another point
of view, physical-layer covert communication can provide
another kind of solution to Panda-Hunter game. If we can hide
the transmission in noise and interference of noisy wireless
channels, the hunter will not be able to ascertain which sensor
is transmitting, and therefore cannot trace back to the source.
B. AWGN Channels
1) Channel Model: Consider a wireless communication
scene where Alice (A) wishes to send a message to Bob (B).
Right next to them, a warden Willie (W) is eavesdropping over
wireless channels and trying to find whether or not Alice is
transmitting.
We adopt the wireless channel model similar to [4] [19].
Consider a time-slotted system where the time is divided into
successive slots with equal duration. All wireless channels are
assumed to suffer from discrete-time AWGN with real-valued
symbols. Alice transmits n real-valued symbols {s(a)i }ni=1.
Bob observes a vector {y(b)i }ni=1, where y(b)i = s(a)i + z(b)i ,
and z
(b)
i is the noise Bob experiences which can be expressed
as z
(b)
i = z
(b)
i,0 + I
(b)
i , where {z(b)i,0}ni=1 are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables (RVs) repre-
senting the background noise of Bob with z
(b)
i,0 ∼ N (0, σ2b,0),
and {I(b)i }ni=1 are i.i.d. RVs characterizing the aggregate
interference Bob experiences.
Willie observes a vector {y(w)i }ni=1, where y(w)i = s(a)i +
z
(w)
i , and z
(w)
i is the noise Willie experiences which can be
expressed as z
(w)
i = z
(w)
i,0 + I
(w)
i , where {z(w)i,0 }ni=1 are i.i.d.
RVs representing the background noise of Willie with z
(w)
i,0 ∼
N (0, σ2w,0), and {I(w)i }ni=1 are i.i.d. RVs characterizing the
aggregate interference Willie experiences.
Suppose each node in the network is equipped with one
omnidirectional antenna. The wireless channel is modeled
by large-scale fading with path loss exponent α (α ≥ 2).
The channel gain hi,j of channel from i to j is static over
the signaling period, all links experience unit mean Rayleigh
fading, and σ2b,0 = σ
2
w,0.
2) Network Model: Consider a large-scale wireless net-
work, where the locations of transmitters form a stationary
Poisson point process (PPP) [24] Π = {Xi} on the plane
R
2. The density of the PPP is represented by λ, denoting
the average number of transmitters per unit area. Suppose
each potential transmitter has an associated receiver, the trans-
mission decisions are made independently across transmitters
and independent of their locations for each transmitter, and
the transmission power employed for each node are constant
power 1 Pt. Let the Euclidean distance between node i and
node j is denoted as di,j . The aggregate interference seen
by Bob and Willie are the functional of the underlying PPP
Π = {Xi} and the channel gain,
I
(b)
i ≡
∑
k∈Π
√
Pt
dαb,k
hb,k · s(k)i ∼ N (0, σ2Ib ) (1)
I
(w)
i ≡
∑
k∈Π
√
Pt
dαw,k
hw,k · s(k)i ∼ N (0, σ2Iw ) (2)
where each s
(k)
i is a Gaussian random variable N (0, 1) which
represents the signal of k-th transmitter in i-th channel use,
1Any other channel models with power control or threshold scheduling will
have similar results with some scale factors.
and
σ2Ib =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαb,k
|hb,k|2 =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαb,k
Ψb,k (3)
σ2Iw =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαw,k
|hw,k|2 =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαw,k
Ψw,k (4)
are shot noise (SN) processes, representing the powers of the
interference that Bob and Willie experience. The Rayleigh
fading assumption implies Ψi,j = |hi,j |2 is exponentially
distributed with the mean is E[Ψi,j ] = 1.
The powers of aggregate interferences, σ2Iw and σ
2
Ib
, are RVs
which are determined by the randomness of the underlying
PPP of transmitters and the fading of wireless channels. There-
fore they are difficult to be predicted. Besides, the closed-form
distribution of the aggregate interference is hard to obtain and
we have to bound it. We do not consider the issue of signal
detection at Bob, and assume that Bob knows when Alice
transmits. This can be realized in practice by sharing a secret
time-table between Alice and Bob.
3) Hypothesis Testing: To find whether or not Alice is
transmitting, Willie has to distinguish between the following
two hypotheses
H0 : y
(w)
i = I
(w)
i + z
(w)
i,0 (5)
H1 : y
(w)
i =
√
Pt
dαa,w
ha,w · si + I(w)i + z(w)i,0 (6)
based on the received vector y = {y(w)i }ni=1. We assume
that Willie employs a radiometer as his detector, and does
the following statistic test
T (y) =
1
n
yHy =
1
n
n∑
k=1
y
(w)
k ∗ y(w)k > γ (7)
where γ denotes Willie’s detection threshold and n is the
number of samples.
Let PFA and PMD be the probability of false alarm and
missed detection. Willie wishes to minimize his probability
of error P
(w)
e = (PFA + PMD)/2, but Alice’s objective is
to guarantee that the average probability of error E[P
(w)
e ] =
E[PFA + PMD]/2 > 1/2− ǫ for an arbitrarily small positive
ǫ.
C. THz Band Networks
Next we briefly look into the THz Band channel model [25],
network and blocking model, and rough surface scattering
theory.
1) Channel Model: Suppose each user in the THz Band
network is equipped with a directional antenna, and the
antenna radiation pattern is the cone model, i.e., a single cone-
shaped beam, whose width determines the antenna directivity.
The antenna gain G for the main lobe is given by
G =
2
1− cos(φ/2) (8)
where φ is the directivity angle of antenna. When φ = 2π, it
is an omnidirectional antenna with G = 1.
When Alice transmits a message, the received signal power
at Bob is given by
PRx = Ad
−2
a,b exp(−Kda,b) (9)
where K is the overall absorption coefficient of the medium,
da,b is the distance between Alice and Bob, and A can be
described as
A = PTxGTxGRx
c2
16π2f2
= HGTxGRx (10)
where PTx is the transmit power of Tx, GTx and GRx
are the antenna gain of Tx and Rx, respectively, c is the
speed of the EM wave, and f is the operating frequency,
H = PTxc
2/(16π2f2).
In addition to the path loss, any receiver will experience
the Johnson-Nyquist noise generated by thermal agitation of
electrons in conductors 2, which can be represented as follows
SJN (f) =
hf
exp(hf/kBT )− 1 (11)
where h is Planck’s constant, kB is Boltzmann constant, and
T is the temperature in Kelvin.
2) Network and Blocking Model: All transmitters form a
stationary PPP Π = {Xi} with the density λ on the plane. Tx
and Rx are connected with LOS configurations, as is standard
for a highly directional millimetre-wave or THz Band wireless
link through the air.
In a THz Band network, Rx suffers not only from the noise,
but also from the aggregate interference from other transmit-
ters. However, due to the directionality of THz Band channels,
nodes themselves may act as blockers for interference. In
this paper we use the blocking model proposed in [25] to
analyze the aggregate interference. Suppose the interference
of a certain interferer J at the receiver Bob is zero if the LOS
path between J and Bob is blocked by another interferer. For
any interferer located at a distance x from Bob, the blocking
probability of the interference from this interferer can be
estimated as follows
PB(x) = 1− exp[−λ(x − rB)rB ] (12)
where rB is the blocker radius, λ is the network density.
Besides, if Bob is not in the coverage of the interferer J ,
then J does not contribute to the aggregate interference at Bob.
Given Bob’s antenna directivity angle φ, the probability that
the receiver is not in coverage of an interferer can be given
by
PC =
φ
2π
(13)
then the aggregate interference Bob experiences in a THz Band
network can be represented as
I
(b)
THz = A
∞∑
i=1
r−2i exp(−Kri) · 1{Ii>0} (14)
where ri is the distance between i-th interferer and Bob.
1{Ii>0} is an indicator function, 1{Ii>0} = 1 if Bob is
2In this paper, we do not take into account the effect of the molecular noise.
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Fig. 3. The model of scattering at a rough surface.
Fig. 4. Path gain at 500 GHz frequency as a function of angles θ1 and θ2.
θ1, θ2 = 0◦ · · · 90◦ in steps of 1◦, and θ3 is set to 0◦ . The illuminated
area is approximately 4cm2, the surface correlation length lc = 0.1mm, the
surface height variation σh = 0.01mm.
interfered by the interferer i, 1{Ii>0} = 0 if the interference
signal from i is blocked, or Bob’s antenna directivity is not in
coverage of i. The probability P{1{Ii>0} = 1} = PC(1−PB).
3) Rough Surface Scattering Model: The general surface
scattering model is shown in Fig. 3. A wave, which is incident
on a rough surface under an angle θ1, is scattered into the
direction given by the angles θ2 and θ3.
For a rough surface with infinite conductivity, Kirchhoff
scattering model [26] gives the expression of the scattering
path gain or scattering coefficient, G(f, σh, lc, θ1, θ2, θ3), de-
scribing the scattered with respect to the incident power. In
the expression of the Kirchhoff approximation, parameters lc
(the surface correlation length) and σh (the standard deviation
of the surface height variation) describe the surface proper-
ties. For a smooth surface, the specular reflection component
always dominates. However a rough surface has a strong
diffuse scattering contribution. Fig. 4 shows the path gain at
f = 500GHz frequency as a function of angles θ1 and θ2.
Kirchhoff scattering model offers a higher computational
efficiency and can easily be implemented, so it is used in
many rough surface scattering papers [27] [28] [29], and we
choose this model to calculate the average scattered power.
4) Assessment Metric: We assume Willie place a receiver
within the narrow beam from Alice to Bob. This set-up affords
Willie considerable high receiving signal strength, and the
signal that he measures is large enough for him to detect
the communication between Alice and Bob. However, if Alice
and Bob communication via NLOS configuration, what Willie
can obtain is a weak diffuse scattering field. To quantify the
detection ability of Willie, we assess a normalized secrecy
capacity [30], which relates the strength of Willie’s signal to
Bob’s signal as follows
c¯s =
log(1 + SINRB)− log(SINRW )
log(1 + SINRB)
(15)
where SINRB and SINRW represent Bob and Willie’s
signal to interference plus noise ratio on linear scale, respec-
tively. Given the reflecting path gain of Bob GB and the
scattering path gain of Willie GW , SINRB and SINRW
can be estimated as follows
SINRB =
Ad−2a,b exp(−Kda,b) ·GB
SJN (f) + I
(b)
THz
(16)
SINRW =
Ad−2a,w exp(−Kda,w) ·GW
SJN (f) + I
(w)
THz
(17)
here da,b is the length of NLOS reflecting path between
Alice and Bob, and da,w the length of the scattering path
between Alice and Willie. I
(b)
THz and I
(w)
THz are the aggregate
interferences Bob and Willie experience, respectively.
The normalized secrecy capacity c¯s is 1 if Willie receives
no signal from Alice and 0 if Willie and Bob receive the same
signal. This quantity is a metric which is always used to define
the security of a channel rather than the covertness of wireless
channels. However, we can use it to assess the likelihood of
a successful covert communication and design covert commu-
nication schemes to maximize it. If the normalized secrecy
capacity c¯s is above a predefined threshold, we presume that
covert communication is feasible.
III. COVERT COMMUNICATION IN AWGN CHANNELS
To transmit messages to Bob covertly and reliably, Alice
should encode her messages. In this paper, we use the classical
encoder scheme used in [4] and suppose that Alice and Bob
have a shared secret of sufficient length. At first, Alice and
Bob leverage the shared secret and random coding arguments
to generate a secret codebook. Then Alice’s channel encoder
takes as input message of length L bits and encodes them into
codewords of length n at the rate of R = L/n bits/symbol.
A. Covertness
In a dense wireless network, Willie not only experiences
the background noise, but also the aggregate interference from
other transmitters. The total power of noise and interference
Willie experiences can be expressed as
σ2w = σ
2
w,0 + σ
2
Iw (18)
where σ2w,0 is the power of the background noise, σ
2
Iw
is the
power of the aggregate interference from other transmitters
(defined in Eq. (4)). In general, the interference is more
difficult to be predicted than the background noise, because
the randomness of aggregate interference comes from the
randomness of PPP Π and the fading channels, especially in
a mobile wireless network.
Let P0 be the joint probability density function (PDF) of
y = {y(w)i }ni=1 when H0 is true, P1 be the joint PDF of
y when H1 is true. Using the same analysis method and the
results from [4] [19], if Willie employs the optimal hypothesis
test to minimize his probability of detection error P
(w)
e , then
P
(w)
e ≥
1
2
−
√
1
8
D(P1||P0) (19)
where D(P1||P0) is the relative entropy between P1 and P0,
and the lower bound of P
(w)
e can be estimated as follows [19]
P
(w)
e ≥
1
2
−
√
n
8
· PtΨa,w
2σ2wd
α
a,w
=
1
2
−
√
n
8
· PtΨa,w
2dαa,w
· 1
σ2w,0 + σ
2
Iw
≥ 1
2
−
√
n
8
· PtΨa,w
2dαa,w
· 1
σ2Iw
(20)
The last step is due to σ2w,0 ≪ σ2Iw , since in a dense and large-
scale wireless network, the background noise is negligible
compared to the aggregate interference from other transmitters
[31]. Then the mean of P
(w)
e is
E[P(w)e ] ≥
1
2
−
√
n
8
· PtE[Ψa,w]
2dαa,w
·E
[
1
σ2Iw
]
=
1
2
−
√
n
8
· Pt
2dαa,w
· E
[
1
σ2Iw
]
(21)
for all links experience unit mean Rayleigh fading.
To estimate E[1/σ2Iw ], we should have the closed-form
expression of the distribution of σ2Iw =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαw,k
Ψw,k.
However, σ2Iw is an RV whose randomness originates from
the random positions in PPP Π and the fading channels. It
obeys a stable distribution without closed-form expression for
its PDF or cumulative distribution function (CDF). To obtain
the approximation of the mean of 1/σ2Iw , we propose to use the
Taylor expansion technique (as discussed in [25], Appendix.
B). Particularly, for the mean of an RV Y = g(X), where X
is another RV with mean E[X ] and varianceVar[X ], we have
E[Y ] = g(E[X ]) +
g′′(E[X ])
2
·Var[X ] (22)
Next we estimate the mean and variance of σ2Iw . However,
its mean is not exist if we employ the unbounded path loss
law (this may be partly due to the singularity of the path loss
law at the origin). We then use a modified path loss law to
estimate the mean of σ2Iw ,
l(r) ≡ r−α1r≥ρ, r ∈ R+, for ρ ≥ 0 (23)
This law truncates around the origin and thus removes the
singularity of impulse response function l(r) ≡ r−α. The
guard zone around the receiver (a ball of radius ρ) can be
interpreted as assuming any two nodes can’t get too close.
Strictly speaking, transmitters no longer form a PPP under
this bounded path loss law, but a hard-core point process in
this case. For relatively small guard zones, this model yields
rather accurate results. For ρ > 0, the mean and variance of
σ2Iw are finite and can be given as [32]
E[σ2Iw ] =
λdcd
α− dE[Ψ]E[Pt]ρ
d−α (24)
Var[σ2Iw ] =
λdcd
2α− dE[Ψ
2]E[P 2t ]ρ
d−2α (25)
where d is the spatial dimension of the network, the relevant
values of cd are: c1 = 2, c2 = π, c3 = 4π/3. In the following
discussion, we assume ρ = 1, and all links experience unit
mean Rayleigh fading Ψ ∼ Exp(1) with E[Ψ] = 1 and
E[Ψ2] = 2.
Therefore using Eq. (22), (24), and (25), given the constant
transmit power Pt, E[1/σ
2
Iw
] can be estimated as follows
E
[
1
σ2Iw
]
=
1
E[σ2Iw ]
+
1
(E[σ2Iw ])
3
·Var[σ2Iw ]
=
α− d
λdcdPt
+
(
α− d
λdcdPt
)3
· 2λdcd
2α− d · P
2
t
=
α− d
λdcdPt
[
1 +
2(α− d)2
(2α− d)dcd ·
1
λ
]
=
1
Pt
· f(λ) (26)
where f(λ) is a function of λ,
f(λ) =
1
λ
· α− d
dcd
[
1 +
2(α− d)2
(2α− d)dcd ·
1
λ
]
(27)
Thus, (21) and (26) yield the lower bound of E[P
(w)
e ] as
E[P(w)e ] ≥
1
2
−
√
n
8
· Pt
2dαa,w
·E
[
1
σ2Iw
]
=
1
2
−
√
n
8
· Pt
2dαa,w
· 1
Pt
· f(λ)
=
1
2
−
√
n
8
· f(λ)
2dαa,w
(28)
Suppose E[P
(w)
e ] ≥ 12 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0, then we should set√
n
8
· f(λ)
2dαa,w
< ǫ (29)
and we have
da,w >
[
1
4
√
2ǫ
· f(λ)
]1/α
· n1/(2α). (30)
Therefore, as long as da,w = ω(n
1/(2α)), we can get
E[P
(w)
e ] ≥ 12 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0. This implies that there is
no limitation on the transmit power Pt, the critical factor is
the distance between Alice and Willie. This result is different
from the works of Bash [4] and Soltani [19], in which Alice’s
symbol power is a decreasing function of the codeword length
n. While this may appear counter-intuitive, the result in fact is
explicable. We believe the reasons are two folds. First, higher
transmission signal power will create larger interference which
will make Willie more difficult to judge. Secondly, more close
to the transmitter will give Willie more accurate estimation.
This theoretical result is also verified using the experimental
results in Section III-C. Besides, the lower bound of da,w is
related with the network density λ. If the network is sparse,
the smaller the density λ, the larger the function f(λ), then the
lower bound of da,w will become greater, which means that
in the network settings with less interference, we should put
Alice further away from Willie to guarantee the covertness.
In a denser network with a larger density, the lower bound of
da,w becomes smaller.
B. Reliability
Next, we estimate Bob’s decoding error probability, denoted
by P
(b)
e . Let the total noise power that Bob experiences be
σ2b = σ
2
b,0 + σ
2
Ib
(31)
where σ2b,0 is the power of background noise Bob observes,
σ2Ib is the power of the aggregate interference from other
transmitters. By utilizing the same approach in [4], Bob’s
decoding error probability can be lower bounded as follows,
P
(b)
e (σ
2
b ) ≤ 2
nR−n2 log2
(
1+
Pt
2σ2b
)
= 2
nR−n2 log2
[
1+
Pt
2(σ2b,0+σ
2
Ib
)
]
= 2nR
[
1 +
Pt
2(σ2b,0 + σ
2
Ib
)
]−n/2
≤ 2nR
[
1 +
Pt
2(σ2b,0 + σ
2
Ib
)
n
2
]−1
(32)
where R (bits/symbol) is the rate of encoder, and the last step
is obtained by the following inequality [19]
(1+x)−r ≤ (1+ rx)−1, for any r ≥ 1 and x > −1 (33)
To estimate P
(b)
e (σ2b ), we should have the closed-form
expression of the distribution of σ2Ib . However, σ
2
Ib
obeys a
stable distribution without closed-form expression for its PDF
and CDF. To address wireless network capacity, Weber et
al. [33] employed tools from stochastic geometry to obtain
asymptotically tight bounds on the distribution of the signal-
to-interference (SIR) level in a wireless network, yielding tight
bounds on its complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF).
Define a random variable
Y =
Σk∈ΠPtΨk,bd−αk,b
PtΨa,bd
−α
a,b
=
σ2Ib
PtΨa,bd
−α
a,b
(34)
then, the upper bound on the CCDF of RV Y, F¯u
Y
(y), can be
expressed as ( [33], Eq. 27),
F¯uY(y) =
2
2− δ κλy
−δ +O(y−2δ) (35)
where κ = πE[Ψδ]E[Ψ−δ]E[d2a,b], λ is the intensity of
attempted transmissions in PPP Π, and δ = 2/α. When
Ψ ∼ Exp(1), κ = πΓ(1 + δ)Γ(1 − δ)d2a,b = pi
2δ
sin(piδ)d
2
a,b.
Because σ2Ib is a linear function of Y and they are positive
correlation, we can get the upper bound on CCDF of RV σ2Ib
as follows
F¯uσ2Ib
(x) = P{σ2Ib > x} = P{PtΨa,bd−αa,bY > x}
= P{Y > x
PtΨa,bd
−α
a,b
}
=
2
2− δ κλβ
δx−δ +O(x−2δ)
= ηλβδx−δ +O(x−2δ) (36)
where η = 22−δκ, β = PtΨa,bd
−α
a,b . To strengthen the
achievability results, we assume the channel gain of channel
between Alice and Bob is static and constant, ha,b = 1. Then
β can be denoted as β = Ptd
−α
a,b .
Now define an RV σ¯2Ib who obeys the distribution of Eq.
(36). Then we have
P{σ¯2Ib > x} > P{σ2Ib > x} (37)
which implies that the RV σ¯2Ib stochastically dominates RV
σ2Ib . According to the theory of stochastic orders [34] [35],
E[g(σ¯2Ib)] > E[g(σ
2
Ib
)] (38)
if g(x) is non-decreasing.
Hence the upper bound of Bob’s average decoding error
probability can be estimated as follows
E[P(b)e (σ
2
b )] ≤ E
[
2nR
(
1 +
nPt/4
σ2b,0 + σ
2
Ib
)−1]
(a)
< E
[
2nR
(
1 +
nPt/4
σ2b,0 + σ¯
2
Ib
)−1]
(b)
=
∫ ∞
0
2nR
(
1 +
nPt/4
σ2b,0 + x
)−1
fuσ¯2Ib
(x)dx
= 2nR
∫ ∞
(ηλ)
1
δ β
(
1 +
nPt/4
σ2b,0 + x
)−1
×ηλβδδx−(δ+1)dx (39)
here the inequality (a) holds because RV σ¯2Ib stochastically
dominates RV σ2Ib , and the function g(x) =
(
1 + nPt/4
σ2b,0+x
)−1
is non-decreasing. In equation (b), fu
σ¯2Ib
(x) is PDF of RV
σ¯2Ib whose CCDF is expressed in Eq. (36). It’s PDF can be
represented as follows
fuσ¯2Ib
(x) = ηλβδδx−(δ+1), x ∈ [(ηλ)1/δβ,+∞) (40)
where β = PtΨa,bd
−α
a,b . We set x ∈ [(ηλ)1/δβ,+∞) to
normalize the function so that it describes a probability density.
Let a = nPt/4, the Eq. (39) can be calculated as follows
E[P(b)e (σ
2
b )]
< 2nR
∫ ∞
(ηλ)
1
δ β
(
1 +
a
σ2b,0 + x
)−1
ηλβδδx−(δ+1)dx
= 2nRηλβδδ
[
πa
(a+ σ2b,0)
3/2
−
2a tan−1
(
ηλβδ√
a+σ2b,0
)
(a+ σ2b,0)
3/2
+
2σ2b,0
ηλβδ(a+ σ2b,0)
]
.
When n is large enough, we have
a = nPt/4≫ σ2b,0, a+ σ2b,0 ≈ a. (41)
Let the path loss exponent α = 4, δ = 1/2, η = 22−δκ =
2
2−δ
pi2δ
sin(piδ)d
2
a,b =
2pi2
3 d
2
a,b, we have
2a tan−1
(
ηλβδ√
a+σ2b,0
)
(a+ σ2b,0)
3/2
>
2σ2b,0
ηλβδ(a+ σ2b,0)
(42)
provided that the transmit power Pt satisfies the following
condition3,
Pt >
9
4π4λ2Ψa,b
· σ2b,0 (43)
Therefore we have
E[P(b)e (σ
2
b )]
(a)
< 2nRηλβδδ
[
πa
(a+ σ2b,0)
3/2
]
(b)
< 2nRηλβδδ
π√
a
< 2nRηλβδδ
2π√
nPt
= 2nR
2π2
3
d2a,bλP
1/2
t E[Ψ
1/2]d
−α/2
a,b δ
2π√
nPt
= 2nR
π7/2λ
3
√
n
(44)
where the inequality (a) holds because we have Eq. (42), (b)
is due to a + σ2b,0 ≈ a. E[Ψ1/2] = Γ(1 + 1/2) =
√
π/2 for
Ψ ∼ Exp(1).
Let E[P
(b)
e (σ2b )] ≤ ǫ for any ǫ > 0, we have
nR ≤ log2
(
3ǫ
π7/2λ
· √n
)
(45)
which implies that Bob can receive
L = O(log2
√
n) bits (46)
reliably in n channel uses in the case that α = 4, and L
decreases as the density of interferers λ become larger. This
may be a pessimistic result at first glance since it is lower
than the bound derived by Bash [4], i.e., Bob can reliably
receive O(√n) bits in n channel uses. This is reasonable
3This inequality can be easily derived, mainly because
limn→∞
√
n tan−1( c√
n
) = c for a given constant c, and a + σ2b,0 ≈ a
when n→∞.
because Bob experiences not only the background noise
but also the aggregate interference, resulting lower transmit
throughput. However, in the work of Bash, Alice’s symbol
power is a decreasing function of the codeword length n,
i.e., her average symbol power Pf ≤ cf(n)√n . When Bob use
threshold-scheduling scheme to receive signal, Bob will have
higher outage probability as n →∞. This is because Alice’s
symbol power will become very lower to ensure the covertness
as n → ∞. If we hide communications in noisy wireless
networks, the spatial throughput is higher than the work of
Bash in which only background noise is considered. This will
be discussed in Section III-C.
C. Discussions
1) Spatial Throughput: The spatial throughput is the ex-
pected spatial density of successful transmissions in a wireless
network [33]
τ(λ) = λ(1 − q(λ)) (47)
where q(λ) denotes the probability of transmission outage
when the intensity of attempted transmissions is λ for given
SINR requirement ξ.
In the work of Bash et al. [4], only background noise is
taken into account, Alice can transmit O(√n) bits reliably
and covertly to Bob over n uses of AWGN channels. To
achieve the covertness, Alice must set her average symbol
power P ≤ cf(n)√
n
. Soltani et al. [18] [19] further expanded
Bash’s work. They introduced the friendly node closest to
Willie to produce artificial noise. This method allows Alice to
reliably and covertly send O(min{n, λα/2√n}) bits to Bob
in n channel uses when there is only one adversary. In their
network settings, Alice must set her average symbol power
Pa = O( cλα/2√n ) to avoid being detected by Willie. Thus, given
an SINR threshold ξ, σ2b,0 ≥ 1, and Rayleigh fading with
Ψ ∼ Exp(1), the outage probability of Soltani’s method is
qJ(λ) = P
{
SINR =
PaΨd
−α
a,b
σ2b,0 + PfΨd
−α
a,f
< ξ
}
≥ P{PaΨd−αa,b < ξ}
≥ P
{
cλα/2√
n
Ψd−αa,b < ξ
}
= P
{
Ψ <
1
cλα/2
dαa,bξ
√
n
}
= 1− exp
{
− 1
cλα/2
dαa,bξ
√
n
}
(48)
where Pf is the jamming power of the friendly node, and da,f
is the distance between Alice and the friendly node. Then the
spatial throughput of the network is
τJ (λ) = λ(1 − qJ(λ)) ≤ λ exp
{
− 1
cλα/2
dαa,bξ
√
n
}
. (49)
If we hide communications in the aggregate interference of
a noisy wireless network with randomized transmissions in
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Fig. 5. Sequences of 1000 realizations of noise and aggregate interference.
Here a bounded path loss law is used, l(x) = min{1, r−α}. The transmit
power Pt of nodes are all unity, links experience unit mean Rayleigh fading,
Ψ ∼ Exp(1), and α = 4. A reference point is located at the center of a
square area 100m×100m. Interferers deployed in this area form a PPP on the
plane with λ = 1. Interference the reference point sees is depicted in blue,
the noise is depicted in red.
Rayleigh fading channel and the SINR threshold is set to ξ,
the spatial throughput is [33]
τI(λ) = λ exp{−πλξδd2a,bΓ(1 + δ)Γ(1− δ)} (50)
where δ = 2/α.
As a result of Eq. (49) and (50), we can state that, by
using a friendly jammer near Willie to help Alice, Alice can
reliably and covertly send O(min{n, λα/2√n}) bits to Bob in
n channel uses, which is higher than O(log2
√
n) bits when
the aggregate interference is involved. But as n → ∞, the
spatial throughput of the jamming scheme τJ (λ) reduces to
zero, and the covert communication hiding in interference can
achieve a constant spatial throughput τI(λ) which is higher
than τJ (λ). Hence, although this approach has lower covert
throughput for any pair of nodes, it has a considerable higher
throughput from the network perspective.
2) Interference Uncertainty: From the analysis above, we
found that the interference can indeed increase the privacy
throughput. If we can deliberately deploy interferers to further
increase the interference Willie experiences and does not harm
the receiver, the security performance can be enhanced, such
as the methods discussed in [15] [16] [18] [36].
Overall, the improvement comes from the increased in-
terference uncertainty. If there is only noise from Willie’s
surroundings, Willie may estimate the noise level by gathering
samples although the background noise can be unpredictable
to some extent. However, the aggregate interference is more
difficult to be predicted. Fig.5 illustrates this situation by
sequences of realizations of the noise (normal distribution
with the variance one) and the aggregate interference. The
interference has greater dispersion than the background noise,
thus it is more difficult to sample interferences to obtain a
proper interference level.
Additionally, the aggregate interference is always dominated
by the interference generated by the nearest interferer. If an
interferer gets closer to Willie than Alice, Willie will be
overwhelmed by the signal of the interferer, and his decision
will be uncertain. Let r1 be the distance between the nearest
interferer and Willie, fR1(r) be the PDF of the nearest-
neighbor distance distribution on the plane R2 [37], then
P{r1 < da,w} =
∫ da,w
0
fR1(r)dr
=
∫ da,w
0
2πλr exp(−πλr2)dr
= 1− exp(−πλd2a,w). (51)
We see that when da,w = 1 and λ = 1, P{r1 < da,w} =
0.9568 - that is, there is a dramatically high probability that
Willie will experience more interference from the nearest
interferer. He will confront a dilemma to make a binary
decision. In a dense and noisy wireless network, Willie cannot
determine which node is actually transmitting if he cannot get
closer than Θ(n1/(2α)) and cannot sure no other nodes located
in his detect region.
3) Practical Method and Experimental Results: In the
previous analysis, when Willie samples the noise to determine
the threshold of his detector (radiometer), we presuppose that
Willie knows whether Alice is transmitting or not, and he
knows the power level of σ2Iw . In practice, Willie has no
prior knowledge on whether Alice is transmitting or not during
his sampling process. This implies that Willie’s sample y
(w)
i
follows the distribution
y
(w)
i ∼ N
(√
Pt
dαw,a
h·si·1A+
∑
k∈Π
√
Pt
dαw,k
h·s(k)i , σ2w,0
)
(52)
where 1A is an indicator function, 1A = 1 if Alice is
transmitting, 1A = 0 if Alice is silent, and the transmission
probability P{1A = 1} = p.
If Alice transmits messages and is silent alternately, Willie
cannot be certain whether the samples contain Alice’s signals
or not. To confuse Willie, Alice should not generate burst
traffic, but transforming the bulk message into a smooth
network traffic with transmission and silence alternatively. She
can divide the time into slots, then put message into small
packets. After that, Alice sends a packet in a time slot with
the transmission probability p and keeps silence for the next
slot with the probability 1− p, and so on. Via this scheduling
scheme, Alice can guarantee that Willie’s samples are the mix
of noise and signal which are undistinguishable by Willie.
Next we provide an experimentally-supported analysis of
this method. Fig. 6 illustrates an example of sequences of
100 Willie’s samples [y
(w)
1 ]
2, ..., [y
(w)
n ]2 in the case that Alice
is silent, transmitting, or transmitting and silent alternately.
Willie then computes T (y) = 1n
∑n
k=1[y
(w)
k ]
2. Clearly, when
Alice alternates transmission with silence, Willie’s sample
value T (y) will decrease and quite near the value when Alice
is silent. The transmitted signals resemble white noise, and are
sufficiently weak in this way.
With the same simulation settings of Fig. 6, we evaluate
Willie’s sample values T (y) by varying the transmit power
Pt. As displayed in Fig. 7, the value T (y) changing with Pt
is displayed in three cases, i.e., Alice is transmitting, silent,
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2 in three cases are depicted as three lines. Here a bounded
path loss law is used, l(x) = min{1, r−α}. The transmit power Pt is unity,
links experience unit mean Rayleigh fading, Ψ ∼ Exp(1), α = 4, and
σ2w,0 = 1. Willie is located at the center of a square area 100m×100m. The
distance between Alice and Willie da,w = 1. Interferers deployed in this area
form a PPP on the plane with λ = 1.
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Fig. 7. The transmit power Pt versus Willie’s sample values T (y) which
are the average of 100 experiment runs, each with the number of samples
n = 500. During each run of simulation, to obtain a sample y
(w)
i , a random
wireless network obeying PPP on the plane is generated. Here the distance
between Alice and Willie da,w = 1. All nodes in the network use constant
transmit power.
as well as transmitting and silent alternately. We find that
when Alice employs the alternation method, Willie’s sample
values decrease, approximating to the case Alice is silent.
Further, the results indicate that higher transmit power cannot
lead to stronger capability for Willie to distinguish Alice’s
transmission behavior. With the transmit power increases,
Willie’s sample values T (y) increase. However, the aggregate
interference increases as well, resulting in the gap of sample
values between Alice’s transmission and silence does not
increase. Consequently, this is consistent with the result of the
previous analysis, which indicates that increasing the transmit
power Pt does not increase the risk of being detected by Willie
in a wireless network.
Further, one of critical factors affecting covert communi-
cation is the parameter da,w, the distance between Alice and
Willie, which should satisfies da,w = ω(n
1/(2α)) to ensure
communication covertly. Fig. 8 illustrates Willie’s sample
values T (y) by varying the distance da,w. As the results
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Fig. 8. The distance between Alice and Willie da,w versus Willie’s sample
values T (y) which are the average of 100 experiment runs, each with the
number of samples n = 500. Here the transmit power Pt = 10, and the
transmission probability p = 0.5.
show, when Alice is silent, Willie’s sample values T (y) barely
change since Willie only experiences the background noise and
aggregate interference. When Alice is transmitting, persistence
or alteration, Willie’s sample values increase with decreasing
the distance da,w. When da,w ≤ 1, Willie’s sample values
become relatively stable since we employ the bounded path
loss law l(x) = min{1, r−α}.
For the following analysis, we evaluate the effect of the
number of samples n on the distance between Alice and
Willie da,w. We start by comparing Willie’s sample values
by varying n to show the difference in performance. The
results in Fig. 9 shows T (y) with respect to the distance
da,w when n = 1000 and n = 3000. As can be seen,
although the curves of the average T (y) do not change, the
discreteness of T (y) decreases with increasing the number
of samples n. As to Willie, to detect Alice’s transmission
attempts, he should distinguish the three lines in the picture
with relatively low probability of error. The only way to
decrease the probability of error is increasing the number of
samples. By choosing a larger value for n, Willie’s uncertainty
on noise and interference decreases, hence he can stay far away
from Alice to detect her transmission attempt. As illustrated
in Fig. 9(a), Willie cannot distinguish Alice’s transmission
from silence when he stays at a distance of more than 1
meter to Alice. However, when Willie increases the number
of samples, he can distinguish Alice’s behavior far away. As
depicted in Fig. 9(b), Willie can detect Alice’s transmission at
the distance between 1 and 1.5 meters with low probability of
error. Overall, this experimental result agrees with the previous
theoretical derivation, i.e., given the value n, the distance
between Alice and Willie should be larger than a bound to
ensure the covertness, and the bound of da,w increases with
the increasing of n.
IV. COVERT COMMUNICATIONS IN THZ BAND
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
In THz Band, we always use directional communication
channels with a beam divergence angle much smaller than
that used by existing mobile networks, which often use 120◦
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Fig. 9. The discreteness of Willie’s sample values T (y) versus the distance
da,w when the number of samples n = 1000 and n = 3000. At each
subfigure, three simulation curves are given (from top to bottom): Alice is
transmitting, transmitting and silent alternately (with transmission probability
p = 0.5), and silent completely. For each occasion, given a value da,w and
n, we implement 20 experiment runs to obtain 20 sample values T (y), and
depict the discreteness of T (y) in boxplot form. The width of curves also
represent the dispersion degree of Willie’s sample values.
sectors. Intuitively, the narrow, razor-sharp beam of THz Band
can drastically limit the eavesdropping probability and can
improve the data security [38]. However, as discussed in
[30], an eavesdropper can place an object in the path of
the THz Band transmission to scatter radiation towards the
eavesdropper. Even when Alice and Bob are transmitted at
high frequencies with very directional and narrow beam, the
eavesdropper can intercept signals in their LOS directional
transmissions.
Covert communication is more difficult than anti-
eavesdropping communication. Next we present a scheme that
utilizes reflection or diffuse scattering from the rough surface
to prevent being detected by Willie.
A. Covert Communications in THz Band Networks
In a THz Band network (as depicted in Fig. 2), we suppose
that all transmitters form a stationary PPP Π = {Xi} with the
density λ on the plane. Alice and Bob have a LOS highly
directional mm-wave or THz Band wireless link. Willie is
located in the THz Band transmission path between Alice and
Bob, and evaluates the signal strength. Willie’s goal is to detect
the transmit behavior between Alice and Bob.
From Willie’s point of view, his best policy is inserted
himself into the LOS transmission path between Alice and
Bob. Therefore, to bypass the detection of Willie, Alice and
Bob cannot use the LOS wireless link between them. To
perform covert communications, Alice and Bob need resorting
to reflection or diffuse scattering NLOS transmission paths,
• Specular Reflection Covert Communication: At first,
Alice and Bob find a surface in the surroundings that the
THz beam from Alice can be specularly reflected to the
antenna of Bob, i.e., the specular reflection path
−−→
AO1 and−−→
O1B in Fig. 2. As illustrated in Fig. 4, among the signals
scattered from a rough surface, the specular reflection
component always dominates.
• Diffuse Scattering Covert Communication: If a spec-
ular reflection path cannot be found, Alice and Bob
find a diffuse scattering path so that Bob’s received
signal strength is above a threshold, such as the diffuse
scattering path
−−→
AO2 and
−−→
O2B in Fig. 2. Although the
diffuse scattering signal is weak in comparison to the
specular component, it is sometimes still high enough to
enable the NLOS link on short distances.
B. Analysis
We use normalized secrecy capacity c¯s to assess the like-
lihood of a successful covert communication. If c¯s is above
a predefined threshold, we presume that the covert commu-
nication is feasible. To estimate c¯s, we need to calculate the
aggregate interference I
(b)
THz , I
(w)
THz and SINRB , SINRW .
Next, we first estimate the mean of the aggregate interference
I
(b)
THz Bob observed (in Eq. (14)) as follows,
E[I
(b)
THz ] = E
[
A
∞∑
i=1
r−2i e
−Kri · 1{Ii>0}
]
(a)
= Aλ
∫
Xi∈Π
r−2i e
−Kri · PC(1− PB)dXi
= Aλ
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
∫ R
rB
r−2e−Kr
φ
2π
· e−λ(r−rB)rBrdr
= AλφeλrB
2
∫ R
rB
1
r
e−(K+λrB)rdr
= AλφeλrB
2
[
Ei(−R(K + λrB))
−Ei(−rB(K + λrB))
]
(53)
where Ei(·) is the exponential integral function. R is the
radius of the zone where the nodes provide non-negligible
interferences. The signal that comes from Tx that is further
than R is considered as the background noise. Eq. (a) follows
directly after Campbell’s theorem [32] for the mean of a sum
function of a stationary PPP Π = {Xi}.
Similarly, the variance of the aggregate interference I
(b)
THz
can be obtained as follows,
Var[I
(b)
THz ]
= Var
[ ∞∑
i=1
Ar−2i e
−Kri · 1{Ii>0}
]
(a)
= λ
∫
Xi∈Π
[
Ar−2i e
−Kri · PC(1− PB)
]2
dXi
= λ
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
∫ R
rB
[
Ar−2e−Kr · φ
2π
· e−λ(r−rB)rB]2rdr
= A2λ
φ2
2π
e2λrB
2
∫ R
rB
1
r3
e−(2K+2λrB)rdr
= A2λ
φ2
2π
e2λrB
2
{
2(K + λrB)
2Ei
[−2(K + λrB)]
+e−2(K+λrB)r · (K + λrB
r
− 1
2r2
)}
R
rB
(54)
Here Eq. (a) also follows directly after Campbell’s theorem for
the variance of a sum function of a stationary PPP Π = {Xi}.
With the mean and variance of I
(b)
THz in hands, we can
estimate the mean of SINRB by Taylor expansion technique
in [25] as follows,
E[SINRB] = E
[
PRx
SJN (f) + I
(b)
THz
]
(55)
=
PRx
SJN (f) +E[I
(b)
THz ]
+
PRx
(SJN (f) +E[I
(b)
THz ])
3
·Var[I(b)THz ]
Here PRx is the received signal strength of Bob, PRx =
Ad−2a,b exp(−Kda,b) · GB , GB is the reflecting or scattering
path gain of Bob, which is obtained from Kirchhoff scattering
model [26], and SJN (f) is the Johnson-Nyquist noise, de-
scribed in Eq. (11). Similarly, we can get the approximation
of the mean of SINRW .
Next we assess the effects of the operating frequency,
network density, the surface roughnesses, and the scattering
angle of Willie on the mean of normalized secrecy capacity c¯s.
Throughout this section, we assume that interference coming
from the nodes more than R = 10m from the receiver is zero,
the coefficientH introduced in Eq. (10) is set to 1. The blocker
radius of every node is rB = 0.1m, the distance between Alice
and Bob is da,b = 5m, the absorption coefficient is assume to
be a constantK = 0.01. All nodes in the network are equipped
with directional antennae (Tx and Rx) with directivity angle
φ = π/18. Also, throughout this section we assume the
illuminated area of the reflection surface is approximately
4cm2, the surface correlation length lc = 1.8mm.
1) The Effect of Network Density λ: At first we analyze the
effect of network density λ on the normalized secrecy capacity
c¯s. As illustrated in Fig. 10, if the incident angle of Alice
θ1 = 60
◦ and Bob’s antenna is located exactly in the specular
reflection direction of Alice’s signal, the closer Willie’s scatter-
ing angle θW to θ1, the smaller secrecy capacity c¯s we can get.
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Fig. 10. The normalized secrecy capacity c¯s versus the scattering angle of
Willie θW (50
◦ · · · 60◦) for different network density λ. Here the incidence
angle of Alice θ1 = 60◦ , the surface height variation σh = 0.088mm, and
the operating frequency f = 500GHz.
This is obvious because the scattering coefficientsGB andGW
are very close when ∆ = θ1−θW is small. On the other hand,
the higher the network density λ, the larger the normalized
secrecy capacity and the covert communications are more
likely to succeed. Indeed, as illustrated in Fig. 10, if there is no
other interferers in the surroundings (λ = 0), the normalized
secrecy capacity is so small that the covert communication is
practically impossible for a predefined covert communication
threshold. This also indicates that the aggregate interference is
helpful to covert communication. As the density increases, the
normalized secrecy capacity increases to close 1 which implies
that the received signal strength of Bob is much stronger than
Willie’s signal. Indeed, as depicted in Fig. 4, the reflected
component is rather strong and easily allow communication
through reflected path, but the diffuse scattering field is very
weak and mostly under the noise.
2) The Effect of Operating Frequency: Next considering
the effect of operating frequency f on c¯s. Fig. 11 shows the
comparison when different operating frequencies are taken into
account. We can notice that the secrecy capacity increases
with the frequency when the scattering angle is close to the
specular reflection direction, but decreases with the frequency
when the receiver angle of Willie gradually deviates from
the reflection direction. This is reasonable since the scattering
always increases with the operating frequency. As discussed in
[39] and [27], when the frequency increases, it will give less
energy at the reflected path, but more energy in the diffuse
scattering directions. This also implies that the normalized
secrecy capacity should decreases along with the increase of
frequency.
3) The Effect of Surface Roughness: The effect of surface
roughness on the secrecy capacity c¯s is illustrated in Fig. 12.
In this measurement, we fix the surface correlation length
lc, only change the standard deviation of the surface height
distribution σh which gives information about the overall
height variations on the surface. We notice that the larger
value of σh results in lower normalized secrecy capacity. The
underlying reason for this behavior is that, for smaller value of
σh, the surface is a more smooth surface with a purely specular
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Fig. 11. The normalized secrecy capacity c¯s versus the scattering angle of
Willie θW (50
◦ · · · 60◦) for different operating frequencies. Here the inci-
dence angle of Alice θ1 = 60◦, the surface height variation σh = 0.058mm,
and the network density λ = 0.01.
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Fig. 12. The normalized secrecy capacity c¯s versus the scattering angle
of Willie θW (50
◦ · · · 60◦) for different surface roughnesses σh. Here the
incidence angle of Alice θ1 = 60◦ , the operating frequency f = 500GHz,
and the network density λ = 0.01.
reflection component, a larger value of σh would represent a
relatively more rough surface with a stronger diffuse scattering
contribution [29].
4) The Effect of Bob’s Scattering Angle in Diffuse Scatter-
ing Covert Communications: In practice, the reflected compo-
nents are rather strong and easily allow covert communication
through reflected paths. However, Alice and Bob cannot al-
ways find a specular reflection path to perform their NLOS
communications. Normally, the signal came from the diffuse
scattering field is very weak and mostly under the noise, but in
some cases it is high enough to enable NLOS communications.
As an alternative, Alice and Bob may use diffuse scattering
to perform covert communications.
Fig. 13 demonstrates the effect of Bob’s scattering angle θB
on the normalized secrecy capacity c¯s. Given the incidence
angle of Alice θ1 = 60
◦, we fix the receiver angle of Willie
θW at 52
◦ and 55◦, then calculate the value c¯s at different
scattering angle of Bob θB(55
◦ · · · 60◦). The results show that,
the closer Bob’s scattering direction to the specular reflection
direction, the larger the value of c¯s. On the other hand, a
more smooth surface (with less σh) will have less scattering
strength and therefore will have larger c¯s. However, if the
scattering angle deviates from the direction of reflection for
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Fig. 13. The normalized secrecy capacity c¯s versus the scattering angle of
Bob θB(55
◦ · · · 60◦) for different surface roughnesses σh. Here the incidence
angle of Alice θ1 = 60◦, the operating frequency f = 500GHz, and the
network density λ = 0.01.
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Fig. 14. The normalized secrecy capacity c¯s versus the incident angle of sig-
nal θ1(20◦ · · · 80◦) for different surface roughnesses σh. Here the scattering
angle of Willie θW = θ1 − 5◦, the operating frequency f = 500GHz, and
the network density λ = 0.01.
several degree, the value of c¯s will decrease rapidly, especially
when the surface is rougher.
5) The Effect of Incident Angle: Finally we illustrate the
effect of incident angle. Fig. 14 depicts the tendency of
normalized secrecy capacity c¯s with the incident angle θ1.
In the measurement setup, we assume Bob is located in the
reflected direction θB = θ1, and Willie’s receiver angle is fixed
as θW = θB − 5◦. We observe that, when the incident angle
θ1 increases, the value of c¯s becomes larger. However, this
increase is not rapid. Besides, the more smooth the surface,
the higher the c¯s. This is due to the fact that a smooth surface
has a stronger specular reflection component.
C. Discussions
1) The Selection of Reflection Points:
• If Alice and Bob can find several specular reflection
pathes to perform their NLOS communications, they
should select in the first place the path whose reflection
point is closest to the receiver Bob. In this case, Willie’s
detection interval will be minimized. As depicted in Fig.
15, Alice and Bob have two specular reflection pathes,
i.e., A⇒ O1 ⇒ B (with O1 as the reflection point) and
A ⇒ O2 ⇒ B (with O2 as the reflection point). The
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Fig. 15. The selection of reflection points. O1 and O2 are two reflection
points, O1B and O2B are their specular reflection directions, O1Q and O1P
are the normal vectors of two scattering surfaces, respectively.
shaded areas represent the scattering angles that Willie
can eavesdrop Alice’s signal. When we choose O1 as the
reflection point, Willie’s eavesdropping interval is Q to
B, smaller than eavesdropping interval P to B when O2
is chosen as the reflection point.
• If there are several points with the same distance to Bob,
the point with the largest incident angle θ1 will be the
best choice, since the larger the incident angle, the higher
the normalized secrecy capacity can achieve, as shown in
Fig. 14.
• In some cases, no specular reflection path can be found.
Alice and Bob have to use a scattering path to commu-
nicate. Because the diffuse scattering field is very weak
in comparison to the specular direction, they should find
a scattering point as close to the receiver as possible,
and make the scattering direction close to the specular
reflection direction. In certain circumstances, the diffuse
scattering field may be high enough to enable NLOS
communications. Additionally, a more rough surface with
larger value of σh is preferred because it provides a
stronger diffuse scattering contribution, as illustrated in
Fig. 12, Fig. 13, and Fig. 14.
2) Willie’s Detection Strategy:
• In general, to detect the transmission between Alice
and Bob, Willie should put himself in the LOS path
between Alice and Bob, and aim his antenna at Alice
to detect their LOS transmission. After all, the LOS
transmission is the most reasonable and effective method
in THz band. However, if Willie has no information
about the NLOS transmission channels between Alice
and Bob, or does not know which reflected path they
utilize at a particular time, he cannot put his directional
antenna at the right direction. From this perspective, a
better way is to adopt an omnidirectional antenna to
find Alice’s transmit signal, no matter which reflected
path Alice and Bob use. But this method also has some
drawbacks. At first the gain of an omnidirectional antenna
is much lower than a directional antenna with a small
directivity angle. Then, the omnidirectional antenna will
experience more interference from other transmitters in
the vicinity. Fig. 16 also shows the normalized secrecy
capacity Alice and Bob can get when Willie adopts an
omnidirectional or directional antenna. It is important
to note that the omnidirectional antenna has relatively
lower detection capability compared with the directional
antenna. But Looking from the other side, if Willie has
no knowledge about the direction of the reflected signal,
a wrong receiving direction of his directional antenna
would be counterproductive. Therefore, how to determine
the type of antenna is a dilemma that Willie has to be
confronted with.
• As to Willie, the best-case scenario is that he knows
the NLOS transmission path between Alice and Bob.
However it is extremely unwise of Willie to abandon the
LOS path and leave to the possible NLOS path. In THz
band, as a result of the transmission at very high data
rates, the time consumed in transmitting a packet can
be expectedly several orders of magnitude lower than in
classical wireless networks. Placing himself in the place
between Alice and Bob, Willie can not only block the
LOS transmission, but also keep watch on other NLOS
transmission as long as he can move close enough to Bob.
• The previous analysis assumes that the aim of Willie is to
detect the transmission between Alice and Bob. In most
practical scenarios, Willie only cares about whether Alice
is transmitting or not. To detect the transmission attempt
of Alice, Willie should approach Alice as close as possi-
ble, and ensure that there is no other node located closer
to Willie than Alice. Otherwise, Willie cannot determine
which one is the actual transmitter. But in a wireless
network, some wireless nodes are probably placed on
towers, trees, or buildings, Willie cannot get close enough
as he wishes. Furthermore, wireless networks are diverse
and complicated. If Willie is not definitely sure that there
is no other transmitter in his vicinity, he cannot ascertain
that Alice is transmitting. However, in a mobile wireless
network, some mobile nodes may move into the detection
region of Willie, and increase the uncertainty of Willie.
Therefore mobile can improve the performance of covert
communications to some extent.
3) Covert Communication with Artificial Noise in THz
Band: If Alice has several helpers who can generate artificial
noise, covert communication will become easier. Alice simply
informs these helpers to align their antennae to Willie and
inject artificial noise. Due to the narrow beams, these artificial
noise will only interference Willie, not Bob.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied covert wireless commu-
nications with the consideration of interference uncertainty.
Prior studies on covert communications only considered the
background noise uncertainty, or introduced collaborative jam-
mers producing artificial noise to help Alice in hiding the
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Fig. 16. The normalized secrecy capacity c¯s versus the scattering angle of
Willie θW (50
◦ · · · 60◦) for different antennas of Willie. Here the incidence
angle of Alice θ1 = 60◦ , the surface height variation σh = 0.058mm, and
the operating frequency f = 800GHz.
communication. By introducing interference measurement un-
certainty, we find that uncertainty in noise and interference
experienced by Willie is beneficial to Alice, and she can
achieve undetectable communication with better performance.
For AWGN channels, if Alice want to hide communications
with interference in noisy wireless networks, she can reliably
and covertly transmit O(log2
√
n) bits to Bob in n channel
uses. Although the covert rate is lower than the square root
law, its spatial throughput is higher as n → ∞. As to THz
Band networks, covert communication based on reflection or
diffuse scattering is a possible information hiding way. From
the network perspective, the communications are hidden in
noisy wireless networks. It is difficult for Willie to ascertain
whether a certain user is transmitting or not, and what he sees
is merely a shadow wireless network.
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